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    .Marples,  Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private EquityManagers. Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2007, p.6. Notes 40547.Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, HR 1424, Title VII, Sec.457A, (a).Availableonline at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.48.A New Era of Resposibility: Renewing America s Promise.U.S.Offi ce of Management andBudget, February 26, 2009, p.122.49.Securities and Exchange Commission, Offi ce of Inspector General s (OIG) report onAudit of SEC s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The ConsolidatedSupervised Entity Program, Report No.446 A, Sec.gov, September 25, 2008.www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf.50.Andrew Lo, Hedge Funds, Systematic Risk, and the Finanicial Crisis of 2007-2008. U.S.House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.November 13, 2008,pp.9-10, Figure 3.51. BIS Quarterly Review. Bank for International Settlements, June, 2009, Table 19.www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf.Market values are usually much higher thannotional values of derivatives.52.Fortune, Peter,  Margin Requirements, Margin Loans, and Margin Rates: Practice andPrinciples. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review, September 1, 2000,p.27.53. Wild-animal spirits. Economist, January 22, 2009, online edition.www.economist.com.54. Credit Markets Get Ugly as Tarp Turns its Back on Toxic Assets. Financial Times,November 20, 2008, p.43.55.Lo 2008, supra note 50, pp.8 9.Chapter 6: Leverage At Brokers and Banks1.FDIC,  Final Rule on Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework Basel II. FinancialInstitution Letters 107, December 7, 2007.2.Securities and Exchange Commission,  Final Rule: Alternative Net Capital Requirementsfor Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities. June 9, 2004.www.sec.gov//rules/final/34-49830.htm.3.Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General s (OIG) report on Auditof SEC s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated SupervisedEntity Program, Report No.446 A, Sec.gov, September 25, 2008, p.19.www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf.4.Stephen Labaton,  Agency s  04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt. New York Times,October 3, 2008, p.A1.5.Recording of SEC open meeting on April 28, 2004, remarks of Annette Nazareth,Director of SEC Division of Market Regulation.Recording available online at: www.connectlive.com/events/secopenmeetings/2004index.html.6.Ibid, remarks of Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid.7.OIG Report, supra note 3, p.19.8.Recording, supra note 5, Remarks of Commissioner Goldschmid and Director Nazareth.9.SEC Adopting Release for Final Rule, supra note 2, Summary.10.OIG Report, supra note 3, p viii.11.The Treasury has suggested that the SEC cease to provide consolidated regulationto investment banks, which should seek consolidated regulation under the Federal 406 note sReserve.Treasury White Paper, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: RebuildingFinancial Supervision and Regulation.June 2009, pp.36 37.However, smaller investmentbanks and smaller broker-dealers should not be subject to the Fed s jurisdiction unless theyare part of a bank holding company.12. Growing Insecurities. Economist, January 17, 2009, p.73.13.The Treasury would create an Office of National Insurance with the responsibility to mon-itor all aspects of the U.S.insurance industry and to coordinate with international insur-ance regulators.Treasury White Paper, supra note 11, pp.39 40.14.Beth Healy,  Markopolos: SEC s regional turf tiffs hampered case. Boston Globe, February5, 2009.www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/02/05/markopolos_secs_regional_turf_tiffs_hampered_case/.15.Marcy Gordon Associated Press,  Schapiro Pledges Toughness at SEC. Washington Times,January 16, 2009, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/16/crisis-of-onfidence/.16.Neil A.Simon,  Finra had authority to examine Madoff s firm. InvestmentNews.com,January 18, 2009.online edition at investmentnews.com.17.David Scheer and Jesse Westbrook,  Madoff  Tragedy Said to Have Escaped Scrutiny by theSEC. Bloomberg.com, December 15, 2008.18.Ibid.19.Joanna Chung, SEC to enlist help on fraud. Financial Times, April 1, 2009, p.15.20.SEC Press Release 2009-109, May 14, 2009.21.Financial Planning Association vs.SEC, 482 F.2d 481 (DC Circuit 2007).22.Rand Institute for Civil Justice,  Investor and Industry Perspectives on Investment Advisersand Broker-Dealers. Sponsored by the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),January 3, 2008.www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf.23.See Treasury White Paper, supra note 11, pp.71 72.24.See, for example, Testimony of Robert Kuttner before the Committee on FinancialServices U.S.House of Representatives, Washington D.C.October 2, 2007, http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/testimony_-_kuttner.pdf.25.12 U.S.C.§ 24 (seventh).26.Federal Reserve Notice, Docket No.R-0841,  Revenue Limit on Bank IneligibileActivities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting andDealing in Securities. December 20, 1996, www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/1996/19961220/R-0841.pdf.The increased amount of underwriting permittedover time arose from changing interpretations of the phrase engaged principally in securitiesbusiness.27.Alex Tabarrok, Glass Steagall: The Real History. Marginal Revolutions, September 19, 2008,www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/09/glass-steagall.html.28.Eugene White, 1986, Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment Activitiesof National Banks. Explorations in Economic History 23, January, 1986, pp.33 55.29.Randall S.Kroszner and Raghuram G.Rajan,  Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified?: Evidencefrom the U.S.Experience with Universal Banking 1921-1933. American Economic Review,1994, vol 84, pp.810 832.Available on professor Rajan s web site http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/raghuram.rajan/research/papers/randy1.pdf. Notes 40730.This one signifi cant player in the market for mortgage-backed securities was WashingtonMutual. Failed Bank List. FDIC.gov, www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.31.Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic StabilizationAct of 2008: Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting.Offi ce of the Chief Account Division ofCorporation Finance, U.S.SEC.December 30, 2008, pp.4, 118 120.32. Shareholder Report on UBS Write-Downs. UBS, April 18, 2008, p.14.33 [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]

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