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.One canconsider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, howeverfrequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion.But when the fairsex, or music, or good cheer, or any thing, that naturally ought to beagreeable, becomes indifferent, it easily produces the opposite affection.But custom not only gives a facility to perform any action, but likewise aninclination and tendency towards it, where it is not entirely disagreeable,and can never be the object of inclination.And this is the reason whycustom encreases all active habits, but diminishes passive, according tothe observation of a late eminent philosopher.The facility takes off fromthe force of the passive habits by rendering the motion of the spirits faintand languid.But as in the active, the spirits are sufficiently supported ofthemselves, the tendency of the mind gives them new force, and bendsthem more strongly to the action.SECT.VIOf the influence of the imagination on the passions`Tis remarkable, that the imagination and affections have close uniontogether, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirelyindifferent to the latter.Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a newvivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with theimagination in all its variations.Whether this proceeds from theprinciple above-mention'd, that any attendant emotion is easily convertedinto the predominant, I shall not determine.`Tis sufficient for mypresent purpose, that we have many instances to confirm this influenceof the imagination upon the passions.Any pleasure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than anyother, which we own to be superior, but of whose nature we are whollyignorant.Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: Theother we conceive under the general notion of pleasure; and `tis certain,that the more general and universal any of our ideas are, the lessinfluence they have upon the imagination.A general idea, tho' it benothing but a particular one consider'd in a certain view, is commonlymore obscure; and that because no particular idea, by which we representa general one, is ever fix'd or determinate, but may easily be chang'd forother particular ones, which will serve equally in the representation.There is a noted passage in the history of Greece, which may serve forour present purpose.Themistocles told the Athenians, that he hadform'd a design, which wou'd be highly useful to the public, but which`twas impossible for him to communicate to them without ruining theexecution, since its success depended entirely on the secrecy with whichit shou'd be conducted.The Athenians, instead of granting him fullpower to act as he thought fitting, order'd him to communicate hisdesign to Aristides, in whose prudence they had an entire confidence,and whose opinion they were resolv'd blindly to submit to.The design ofThemistocles was secretly to set fire to the fleet of all the Greciancommonwealths, which was assembled in a neighbouring port, andwhich being once destroy'd wou'd give the Athenians the empire of thesea without any rivaL Aristides return'd to the assembly, and told them,that nothing cou'd be more advantageous than the design ofThemistocles but at the same time that nothing cou'd be more unjust:Upon which the people unanimously rejected the project.A late celebrated(14) historian admires this passage of antient history, asone of the most singular that is any where to be met.`Here,' says he, `they are not philosophers, to whom `tie easy in theirschools to establish the finest maxims and most sublime rules ofmorality, who decide that interest ought never to prevail above justice.`Tis a whole people interested in the proposal.which is made to them,who consider it as of importance to the public good, and whonotwithstanding reject it unanimously, and without hesitation, merelybecause it is contrary to justice.'For my part I see nothing so extraordinary in this proceeding of theAthenians.The same reasons, which render it so easy for philosophers toestablish these sublime maxims, tend, in part, to diminish the merit ofsuch a conduct in that people.Philosophers never ballance betwixt profitand honesty, because their decisions are general, and neither theirpassions nor imaginations are interested in the objects.And tho' in thepresent case the advantage was immediate to the Athenians, yet as it wasknown only under the general notion of advantage, without beingconceiv'd by any particular idea, it must have had a less considerableinfluence on their imaginations, and have been a less violent temptation,than if they had been acquainted with all its circumstances: Otherwise`tie difficult to conceive, that a whole people, unjust and violent as mencommonly are, shou'd so unanimously have adher'd to justice, andrejected any considerable advantage.Any satisfaction, which we lately enjoy'd, and of which the memory isfresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another ofwhich the traces are decay'd, and almost obliterated.From whence doesthis proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy.andgives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? The image of thepast pleasure being strong and violent, bestows these qualities on theidea of the future pleasure, which is connected with it by the relation ofresemblance [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]