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.77 A deal to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years eluded them,mainly due to Reagan s insistence that SDI testing would not be confined to thelaboratory alone.78 For European governments, this was deeply ironic.SDI, especially thePresident s version of it, was regarded, at best, with scepticism and at worst with outrighthostility (especially in France).79 It had, however, prevented an even worse situation ade-nuclearised Europe that might thereby become  safe for conventional war.SDI hadaverted the nuclear-free world that, for Reagan at least, was its ultimate objective.So alarmed by what had almost happened was the British Government that Thatcherquickly made another visit to the United States, and  descended like a thundercloud uponWashington.80 After meeting the Vice-President, Secretary of State and DefenseSecretary, she obtained the agreement of Reagan himself that SDI research would remainwithin the constraints of the ABM Treaty, and that NATO s flexible response strategywould continue to require a mix of nuclear systems.The supply of Trident was alsoconfirmed.Thatcher left well pleased.81 Once again, Britain had acted as a moderatinginfluence in Washington, a fact apparently welcomed by many US officials.82By 1987 much of the heat had gone out of the SDI debate.SDI s chief sponsor,President Reagan, was in his final year of office.Cold War tensions were easingnoticeably, especially in view of internal developments in the Soviet Union and theprogress of arms control negotiations.It was clear that whatever promise SDItechnologies might hold, operational deployment was still many years away.In 1988 itremained the MoD s view:  The UK supports SDI less as a means of transforming thenuclear relationship between the superpowers, than as a means of preventing the SovietUnion achieving such a transformation on its own terms. 83As Robert Hughes wrote just as the Cold War was coming to an end,  Europeans& bythe end of 1988 were& confident& that SDI was not to be the frightening initiative that ithad been pledged to be at the outset.84 Margaret Thatcher herself later wrote:  I do notknow of any greater historical irony [than] the fact that ideas embodied in SDI have notbeen applied, while the old ABM Treaty is still revered as the cornerstone of stability. 85SDI PARTICIPATIONAt a meeting of the NPG on 18 March 1985, the US Defense Secretary CasparWeinberger raised the possibility of Allied nations participating in SDI research.Thiswas followed a week later by a formal invitation, which specified a 60-day deadline,subsequently dropped, for governments to reply.86 The possibility of UK involvement inresearch had already been discussed by Thatcher the previous month during her visit toWashington,87 and a number of British companies were already working in relatedfields.88US motives for this approach were mixed.In a few highly specialised areas Europeancompanies and research institutions had particular skills and knowledge to offer notavailable in the United States.Many people also suspected that the promise of researchcontracts was being offered to  buy political support for SDI,89 including the impact thatBritain and ballistic missile defence 1942 2002 154foreign support would have on the US domestic debate.The Americans also hoped thatother governments, once they got involved, could be induced to commit some of theirown money.For Allied governments, SDI participation posed a dilemma.There were political anddiplomatic implications to be considered, but also the prospect of work shares and ameans of gaining insight into where the technology might lead.For Britain, where theChevaline project had only recently been completed, involvement in SDI work wouldgive a better appreciation of what strategic defences the UK deterrent might face in thefuture.90 There might also be important technological  spin-offs into other areas.91Conversely, if Britain did not take part many leading scientists might follow the money towhere it was being spent a new  brain drain [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]